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Cigarette Industry Deception

49:56 recording · EN · 2 speakers

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Executive Summary AI
  • Josh and Chuck open by noting the dangers of smoking were known by the 1920s and certain by the 1950s, yet only in 1964 did Surgeon General Luther Terry issue a report drawing on about a dozen studies of roughly a million male smokers, which led to warning labels.2:36
  • The industry's answer was to demand proof: Tobacco Institute vice president Fred Panzer's 1972 memo said to create doubt about the health charge without denying it, while the companies buried studies showing nicotine was addictive and marketed to kids through Superman 2 in 1981 and Joe Camel in 1988.5:53
  • By the mid-90s the companies had won at least 400 lawsuits without a single loss or settlement and were still publicly denying addiction in 1994, so state attorneys general led by Mississippi's Michael Moore joined forces to sue under RICO for Medicaid costs and for deceiving the public.11:18
  • A June 1997 opening offer of $368.5 billion over 25 years needed Congress, which fumbled it, and John McCain's S-1415 bill for 520 billion failed; after Texas, Florida, Minnesota and Mississippi cut their own deals, 46 states, five territories and DC signed the Master Settlement Agreement in November of 1998 for $206 billion over 25 years, plus a ban on cartoon characters and marketing to minors.17:38
  • Youth smoking fell from around 34% to 3.8% in 2021, but less than 3% of the funds went to prevention, North Carolina spent 75% of its share on tobacco production, states securitized payments with bonds, and the companies have paid only $175 billion because a sales formula shifts their competitive losses onto the states.39:25

Brief overview

The 1998 tobacco Master Settlement Agreement cut youth smoking sharply, but states mostly spent the money elsewhere.

  1. The playbook was manufactured doubt, not denialPanzer's 1972 memo: create doubt about the health charge without actually denying it, while studies were buried.
  2. Suing over kids and lies beat suing over smokingThe attorneys general left adult choice alone and went after teen targeting and public deception, which the public could get behind.
  3. States spent the settlement on almost everything but smokingLess than 3% went to prevention, no state funds anti-tobacco programs at CDC levels, and some sold bonds against future payments.

Questions this recording answers

10 questions, each answered where it is said
What did the 1998 tobacco Master Settlement Agreement require from the tobacco companies?

Signed in November 1998, the MSA called for $206 billion paid over 25 years to 46 states, five territories and DC, allocated by estimated smokers and Medicaid costs. Companies had to stop targeting minors, drop cartoon characters in ads, dissolve their sham research groups, release documents and fund a national foundation on underage tobacco use.

Answered around 23:28
How did the state attorneys general finally beat the tobacco industry?

Led by Mississippi attorney general Michael Moore, every state, territory and DC joined forces. They sued to recover Medicaid money spent treating sick smokers and pursued RICO fraud and racketeering claims, focusing on targeting teens and lying to the public, which turned up truckloads of documents about burying studies and addiction.

Answered around 13:41
How did the tobacco industry create doubt about smoking's health risks?

Tobacco Institute vice president Fred Panzer wrote a 1972 memo urging the industry to create doubt about the health charge without denying it. Arguments included that extroverts both smoke more and have more heart attacks, and a 'constitutional hypothesis' that people who get sick are biologically predisposed to illness.

Answered around 5:53
How successful was big tobacco in court before the settlements?

By the mid-1990s the industry had faced at least 400 lawsuits and never lost or settled one, a 100 percent record. It had money for the best lawyers and lobbied state governments for tort reform, arguing tobacco is a natural product, which discouraged people from even filing suit.

Answered around 11:18
What did the tobacco companies first offer in settlement talks?

In April 1997 they offered to drop Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man, and in June proposed $368.5 billion over 25 years. The deal needed Congress because it included FDA regulation, federal indoor smoking restrictions and protection from future civil and class action lawsuits, which proved the sticking point.

Answered around 17:31
Why did John McCain's tobacco bill fail in Congress?

McCain proposed S-1415 with $520 billion and no protection from future lawsuits. The industry lobbied harder than ever against it, and other senators attached unrelated, likely unpopular riders, possibly at the tobacco companies' behest, which sank the bill. Tobacco stock prices went back up after it failed.

Answered around 19:06
How have states actually spent their tobacco settlement money?

Very few states designated the money for anti-smoking programs or smokers' health care. Most used it to fill budget gaps or build roads, and some sold bonds against future payments. Less than 3% went to prevention and cessation, and North Carolina used 75% of its funds for tobacco production.

Answered around 38:16
Have tobacco companies paid everything they promised under the settlement?

No. According to a Vermont attorney general press release, they have paid about $175 billion, less than half. Payments use an inflation calculation and a sales formula that accounts for profits lost to non-participating companies; in some years the sales adjustment outweighed inflation, so states absorbed the competition loss.

Answered around 40:50
What happened in the federal case United States v. Philip Morris?

Launched in 1999, the case sought billions in health care costs and 45 years of profits under RICO. The companies fought and lost: in 2006 a federal judge ruled they were racketeers, cut the penalty to $10 billion, and required admitting fraud, corrective statements and releasing documents, eventually about 14 million.

Answered around 31:01
How did the settlement affect youth smoking rates?

Youth smoking hit an all-time high of 36.4% in 1997, when adults smoked at 24.7%. After the MSA ended direct marketing to kids alongside anti-smoking campaigns, it fell to 3.8% by 2021. However, e-cigarette makers like Juul don't face the same rules, and rates rise when vaping is included.

Answered around 33:54
Key Quote

“And their playbook was basically, nah, prove it.”

— Josh or Chuck, Cigarette Industry Deception, at 3:35▶ listen at 3:35
Key Quote

“We need to create doubt about the health charge without actually denying it.”

— Josh or Chuck, Cigarette Industry Deception, at 6:00▶ listen at 6:00
Key Quote

“So the states have shouldered the burden of competition for these tobacco companies.”

— Josh or Chuck, Cigarette Industry Deception, at 42:09▶ listen at 42:09

Cite this

“Cigarette Industry Deception.” https://26033.mc.tritondigital.com:443/OMNY_STUFFYOUSHOULDKNOW1_PODCAST_P/media-session/96f8d05d-cad1-4771-8e7f-c517def7ef32/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/a91018a4-ea4f-4130-bf55-ae270180c327/9b441792-f960-4432-811f-b48d0118b80e/audio/direct/t1784624487/The_Tobacco_Master_Settlement_That_Time_We_Got_Em.mp3. Transcript summary by WhipScribe, https://whipscribe.com/transcript-pages/cigarette-industry-deception.html.

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