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Private Credit and Skin in the Game

59:13 recording · EN · 4 speakers

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Executive Summary AI
  • Tracy Allaway and Joe Weisenthal set up the episode around who bears a loss, noting that after 2008 policymakers deliberately pushed risky lending out of the regulated banking system and into private credit vehicles that were supposed to absorb their own losses.4:35
  • Guests Andrew Granato (UT Austin) and Pranjal Dral (Yale), authors of 'Private Credit State Backstop, How Private Equity Socializes Risk Through Insurers', describe the flywheel of buyout arm, private credit fund and life insurer, with recent estimates of roughly $750 billion of life insurance assets inside private equity's purview.11:21
  • They argue the weak link is valuation: private letter ratings reported to the NAIC by agencies such as Egan Jones are not publicly visible, and new empirical work keeps finding overvaluation in these assets.21:21
  • Unlike the FDIC's pre-funded, risk-weighted deposit insurance capped at 250k, state guarantee funds only assess surviving insurers after an insolvency, cover roughly 300k (about the 40th percentile of life policies), and let insurers reclaim the assessment through tax credits in about 34 states, making it what they call a stealth taxpayer bailout.27:14
  • Tracy closes with the Guggenheim-linked insurers Delaware Life and Clear Spring, whose disclosed share of affiliated assets was revised from about 3% to 40% under scrutiny from federal prosecutors investigating Mark Walters.56:17

Brief overview

Private equity has routed private credit through life insurers, shifting risk onto a weak state guarantee backstop.

  1. Risk left banks but landed in insurancePost-2008 reform moved credit risk into private credit, which then migrated onto life insurer balance sheets.
  2. Guarantee funds pay after the failureThe failed insurer contributes $0; surviving insurers are assessed later and mostly recoup it via state tax credits.
  3. Opaque marks defeat the risk rating regimePrivate letter ratings are invisible and unverifiable, and assessments are premium-weighted rather than risk-weighted.

Questions this recording answers

10 questions, each answered where it is said
Why are private equity firms so attracted to life insurers?

McKinsey calls it a flywheel. A PE firm with a buyout arm, a private credit fund and a life insurance entity can finance its own acquisitions, place the loans it issues with the insurer, and rely on the insurer's patient capital instead of LPs constantly demanding returns.

Answered around 8:42
How much life insurance money now sits under private equity's control?

Recent estimates put something like $750 billion of life insurance assets within private equity's purview. What is new over the last 15 years is the aggression: buying life insurers at high volumes and shifting their portfolios away from the stodgy AAA-rated AT&T-style bond holdings insurers were famous for.

Answered around 11:21
What can regulators actually see about private credit on insurer balance sheets?

Only the value reported to them. The NAIC, an association of state regulators, has visibility on everything an insurer holds, but private credit loans are valued by a third-party rating agency and reduced to a notch on a one-to-ten safety scale that then sets required capital.

Answered around 21:48
What happens when a life insurer goes bankrupt?

It does not go into bankruptcy. The insurer's domiciliary state leads a simultaneous insolvency proceeding across every single state, because insurance is regulated at the state level with no federal regulator and no FDIC equivalent. Each state's guarantee fund then covers policyholders up to a statutory cap.

Answered around 27:14
Who actually pays when a guarantee fund makes policyholders whole?

The guarantee fund levies an assessment on every surviving insurer in that state, but only after the insolvency has already happened, so the failed insurer contributed zero of its own. Each bill is weighted by the percentage of premiums that insurer sold in recent years in that line of business.

Answered around 28:46
Do insurers really bear the cost of those assessments?

Mostly not. In the vast majority of states an insurer gets a tax credit against the assessment liability: about 34 states give a full credit taken at 20% a year over five years, another ten spread it over roughly ten years, and only about six give none. It is a stealth taxpayer bailout.

Answered around 29:52
How much of a life insurance policy does the guarantee fund actually cover?

Close to $300,000, against the FDIC's $250,000 statutory cap for deposits. That is only about the 40th percentile of life insurer policies, and many policies are far bigger, since people who buy life insurance tend to be richer. Coverage is much lower than in a bank failure.

Answered around 30:51
Have there ever been runs on life insurers?

Yes, though insurers are structurally less vulnerable on average and it depends on the nuances. Executive Life, a struggling life insurer in the early 1990s, was run on, but it held only a few billion dollars of assets. Nothing like that has happened to a very large life insurer.

Answered around 47:32
What is shadow reinsurance?

Rather than reinsuring with an independent entity, an insurer cedes assets and liabilities to a captive subsidiary reinsurer in Bermuda, or in states competing with it like Iowa or Vermont, where tax rates are very low. Quarterly NAIC data on US holdings is excellent, but ceded assets vanish from view.

Answered around 48:32
What could regulators do to fix this?

Start with valuation reform, since private letter ratings are too generous, including a Pigouvian tax on opacity: a regulatory capital surcharge on assets that are structurally hard to value. Then end the guarantee fund tax credits, move to pre-funding, and borrow banking's source of strength doctrine so affiliates pay.

Answered around 50:21
Key Quote

“It is the idea that you can invest in pretty much anything.”

— Tracy Allaway, Private Credit and Skin in the Game, at 2:19▶ listen at 2:19
Key Quote

“I've actually contributed $0 of my own.”

— Andrew Granato, Private Credit and Skin in the Game, at 29:09▶ listen at 29:09
Key Quote

“It's insurance all the way down.”

— Tracy Allaway, Private Credit and Skin in the Game, at 48:21▶ listen at 48:21

Cite this

“Private Credit and Skin in the Game.” https://26043.mc.tritondigital.com:443/OMNY_ODDLOTS_PODCAST_P/media-session/43b0fbeb-5772-4438-861b-e11027983dab/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/f004446b-a024-4773-bd04-b497017ec344/audio/direct/t1785484877/Why_Private_Credit_Got_Entangled_With_Insurance.mp3. Transcript summary by WhipScribe, https://whipscribe.com/transcript-pages/private-credit-and-skin-in-the-game.html.

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