Private equity has routed private credit through life insurers, shifting risk onto a weak state guarantee backstop.
McKinsey calls it a flywheel. A PE firm with a buyout arm, a private credit fund and a life insurance entity can finance its own acquisitions, place the loans it issues with the insurer, and rely on the insurer's patient capital instead of LPs constantly demanding returns.
Answered around 8:42Recent estimates put something like $750 billion of life insurance assets within private equity's purview. What is new over the last 15 years is the aggression: buying life insurers at high volumes and shifting their portfolios away from the stodgy AAA-rated AT&T-style bond holdings insurers were famous for.
Answered around 11:21Only the value reported to them. The NAIC, an association of state regulators, has visibility on everything an insurer holds, but private credit loans are valued by a third-party rating agency and reduced to a notch on a one-to-ten safety scale that then sets required capital.
Answered around 21:48It does not go into bankruptcy. The insurer's domiciliary state leads a simultaneous insolvency proceeding across every single state, because insurance is regulated at the state level with no federal regulator and no FDIC equivalent. Each state's guarantee fund then covers policyholders up to a statutory cap.
Answered around 27:14The guarantee fund levies an assessment on every surviving insurer in that state, but only after the insolvency has already happened, so the failed insurer contributed zero of its own. Each bill is weighted by the percentage of premiums that insurer sold in recent years in that line of business.
Answered around 28:46Mostly not. In the vast majority of states an insurer gets a tax credit against the assessment liability: about 34 states give a full credit taken at 20% a year over five years, another ten spread it over roughly ten years, and only about six give none. It is a stealth taxpayer bailout.
Answered around 29:52Close to $300,000, against the FDIC's $250,000 statutory cap for deposits. That is only about the 40th percentile of life insurer policies, and many policies are far bigger, since people who buy life insurance tend to be richer. Coverage is much lower than in a bank failure.
Answered around 30:51Yes, though insurers are structurally less vulnerable on average and it depends on the nuances. Executive Life, a struggling life insurer in the early 1990s, was run on, but it held only a few billion dollars of assets. Nothing like that has happened to a very large life insurer.
Answered around 47:32Rather than reinsuring with an independent entity, an insurer cedes assets and liabilities to a captive subsidiary reinsurer in Bermuda, or in states competing with it like Iowa or Vermont, where tax rates are very low. Quarterly NAIC data on US holdings is excellent, but ceded assets vanish from view.
Answered around 48:32Start with valuation reform, since private letter ratings are too generous, including a Pigouvian tax on opacity: a regulatory capital surcharge on assets that are structurally hard to value. Then end the guarantee fund tax credits, move to pre-funding, and borrow banking's source of strength doctrine so affiliates pay.
Answered around 50:21“It is the idea that you can invest in pretty much anything.”
“I've actually contributed $0 of my own.”
“It's insurance all the way down.”
“Private Credit and Skin in the Game.” https://26043.mc.tritondigital.com:443/OMNY_ODDLOTS_PODCAST_P/media-session/43b0fbeb-5772-4438-861b-e11027983dab/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/f004446b-a024-4773-bd04-b497017ec344/audio/direct/t1785484877/Why_Private_Credit_Got_Entangled_With_Insurance.mp3. Transcript summary by WhipScribe, https://whipscribe.com/transcript-pages/private-credit-and-skin-in-the-game.html.